This chapter analyses the position of a directly elected mayor as a mechanism to deliver transformative change to local government in England. Through a narrative exploration of the trajectory of mayoral governance in the City of Bristol, analysis interrogates where the model has succeeded, where it has met barriers, and the capacity of the position of elected mayor to innovate in order to overcome those challenges. Through the use of thematic vignettes, the argument is made that whilst the model offers significant potential for transformative change, a number of historic, structural and contextual factors have significantly limited the capacity for the model to deliver the transformative change that advocates of the model assert is possible. Conclusions are made around which elements restrict the capacity of the mayoral role to reach its potential and the how the model might be adapted in future to enable its full benefits to be realised.
Introduction
When Bristol's first directly elected mayor Independent George Ferguson was elected early on the morning of the 16 th November 2012 he asserted "I believe today we have voted for a new way of doing things" (Ferguson, 2012) . This chapter seeks to explore the capacity of the role to enable things to be done differently. Beyond legalistic conceptions the role of directly elected mayors is itself contested. The constitutional vagueness of the role coupled with the variable geometry of City Deals negotiated before and after the mayoral election posed challenges as well as opportunities for the incumbent mayor. There were significant opportunities for innovation available to the mayor following a City Deal which gave scope to leverage growth in Business Rates, exert greater control over a wide property portfolio of over £1bn worth of assets and utilise a new Growth Hub at The Temple Quarter Enterprise
Zone to draw in investment and incubate growth (Cabinet Office, 2011) . The position of elected Mayor also afforded the incumbent to deliver change on the basis of an electoral proposition from a direct mandate from the citizens of Bristol. As such the mayoral model also conferred a different type of legitimacy. Conversely the capacity to do things differently is naturally bound by a pre-existing institutional system where the roles, functions and procedures are historically informed and institutionally engrained and often slow to adapt to change. The chapter explores a series of individual challenges met by the first incumbent of the role of directly elected mayor of Bristol during his first term of office and the challenges faced by his predecessor Marvin Rees. By addressing them in turn it assesses the capacity of the role and direct mandate of an elected mayor to innovate, adapt and overcome the temporal, structural and institutional barriers to achieve change. The data for this chapter comes from a series of interviews across three years with councillors including former council leaders and cabinet members and council officers from a larger project contrasting councillor perceptions of leadership roles in local government. The project was funded by a Central Research Grant from Oxford Brookes University. Assessment also derives from a situated appraisal by the author as an academic, community activist and resident of the City of Bristol.
Collective action problems and lobbying from above
As residents of ten large English cities voted in referendum on introducing elected mayors there was hope for a reinvigoration of local democracy and a redefinition of relationships between local government and the centre. The referendums were preceded by significant announcements from David Cameron and Cities Minister Greg Clark which laid out a series of benefits of a yes vote. The strongest incentive came with the proposals for Mayors to be 'leading citizens' who would meet bi-annually within a Cabinet of Mayors under the chairmanship of the Prime Minister. The much vaulted 'Cabinet of Mayors' posed a magnificent opportunity for Cities to have a hotline into the heart of Whitehall and the autonomy to choose their own solutions to achieve the growth which the government hoped devolution could deliver. As the returning officers announced the results of all ten referendums it was clear that only Bristol had opted for a Directly Elected Mayor and the new incumbent of the role faced a significant collective action problem. Whilst George Ferguson was given a clear mandate on a turnout of 27.9% and the advantage of high visibility and prominence as an Independent candidate he faced a significant barrier to achieve the lobbying power of the leaders of other English cities. Although the government had a vested interest in delivering for the only city that had chosen its flagship policy in adopting a mayor, and despite access to government ministers over the course of his first term the mayor came back from Whitehall with little more than had previously been offered by the pre-existing City
Deal. Lacking the administrative machinery and networks of comparative city leaders from the main political parties the newly elected mayor faced an uphill struggle to lobby for, and deliver financial resources and new powers alongside others with more established clout in Whitehall. (Barber, 2013) .
With the position of elected mayor delivering few if any additional formal powers, the mayor looked to maximise 'soft power' in the form of positioning Bristol as an exemplar in doing things differently. Italian Prime Minister Matteo Renzi when in position as Mayor of Florence posited that "This city doesn't need a mayor; it needs a marketing expert". In some respects, so did Bristol, which was lagging behind cities such as Manchester, Cardiff and local neighbour Bath as cultural and tourist destination. In an interview with the Guardian Newspaper George Ferguson outlined his priority as "making Bristol known across the world so we don't have to say it's a port somewhere near Bath, which I have found myself saying in China, America and India" (Guardian, 2013) . To address the perceived shortfall Ferguson smartly leveraged Bristol's position as European Green Capital to give it a platform on the international stage in particular at the 2015 United Nations Climate Change Conference in Paris (COP21). In moving Bristol onto a more international footing the mayor sought to lobby from above as well as below. Whilst the tangible benefits of this international approach are yet to be fully realised, the autonomy of the mayor and the mandate which gave him a platform to speak for the City was utilised to its maximum potential to position Bristol on the international stage.
Institutional Roadblocks
Another significant challenge for the incoming mayor came in the form of a series of significant clashes between systems and individuals competing within the formal governance framework of the City. When considering competing models of governance in English local government Lowndes and Leach (2004) stress that changes to governance systems are conditioned by well engrained local norms and practices. This assertion was seemingly manifested by the conflicted and contested environment which ensued during the early days under mayoral governance in Bristol.
An election campaign which targeted party politicians as the short-termist, self-interested groupings which held Bristol back resulted in there being little love lost between the Independent Mayor and the formerly dominant Labour and Liberal Democrat groupings on the council. Following the campaign which depicted the Labour candidate Marvin Rees as the puppet of the Labour party in London, the decision of the local Labour party to turn down invitations to join a multi-party cabinet (Bristol Post, 2012) went some way in defining relationships between many local councillors and the newly elected mayor for his first year of office. As the mayor began his time in office suddenly councillors found that many elements of their traditional role were taken away or lost. The first political hurdle for the elected mayor would come when seeking to put through the first budget of his term of office. At the Full Council meeting the elected councillors were unwilling and the procedural systems illequipped to let go of old ways of working. In line with a requirement to make upwards of £35 million worth of cuts handed down from central government the task of the mayor to deliver a successful budget was unenviable.
The governance arrangements of the mayoral model required the mayor to set a budget which could only be overturned by a two thirds majority and if overturned could result in an intractable legal stalemate. This led to a complex interplay of suggested amendments from the main political parties. The Liberal Democrats in particular who as the outgoing administration were well placed to know where the budget could be adjusted and reserves utilised in order to offset elements of the cuts. What played out was a succession of 'claim making' actions from the mayor and councillor groups whereby each took credit for reversing or altering cuts. The mayor came away with an agreed budget settlement having given a number of concessions from his original outlined plans. Over the next two years the mayor successfully managed to avoid the breadth of concessions on his budget by reasserting the notion of his mandate and using his platform as figurehead to significantly broaden the extent and focus of the budget consultation. In adopting a more direct engagement process the mayor managed to circumvent councillors and be able to take credit for concessions delivered before the budget vote and thus prevent his mandate being undermined within the public Full Council Meeting. During the 2014-2015 Budget Consultation over 3,900 people responded to the budget survey, there were approximately 10,000 views of the consultation website and over 1,300 people turned out a series of public meetings. This represented a significant upturn on previous years and allowed the mayor to both amend his proposals on the basis of responses before the decisions came to Full Council and also gave him a platform to suggest his proposals carried public opinion, evoking direct democracy and a different form of accountability and legitimacy to his predecessors.
Catching up with scrutiny
The strongest criticism of the mayoral model from its detractors is that far from dispersing democracy it concentrates too much power in the office of mayor and too much power in the hands of one individual running the risk that mayors try to rule in 'Napoleonic fashion without being held to account' (Kenny and Lodge, 2008 ). An Inquiry Day held at Bristol City In the case of Bristol, the movement to the mayoral model drew power away from local councillors and neighbourhoods and the procedural mechanisms of council meetings and formal scrutiny process were initially ill equipped to cope with the new model of governance.
Whist needing a significant boost in light of the changes, elements of scrutiny were downgraded, notably and most visibly being a reduction in number, attendance and length of scrutiny meetings according to the majority of interviewees. With potentially contentious decisions being made over the sale of land at the Port of Bristol, Metrobus (a long planned rapid transport route between the South and North of the City) and proposals for a 12,000
capacity Arena near Temple Meads railway station, councillors felt forced to 'call in' decisions which they perceived to have been made without 'proper consideration by anyone outside of the executive team of mayor and officers' (Liberal Democrat Former Cabinet Member). Two of the 'call ins' pertained to issues being removed from individual scrutiny commissions, with councillors feeling they had little control or ownership over the scrutiny work programme, whilst others related directly to strict confidentiality clauses precluding councillors from accessing and sharing council papers without signing a 'blank exempt status' to access the data. This culminated in an unprecedented joint statement from Group
Leaders and Scrutiny Chairs which effectively suggested that they had been gagged (Bristol Post, 2014) . A study of on 'The Impacts of Mayoral Governance in Bristol' also noted councillors felt their 'ability to scrutinise policy and decision making under model was less so than under the previous system' ( Hambleton and Sweeting, 2015:40) .
The mayor moved to stem criticism with a reinvigoration of constitutional arrangements with a new constitution being adopted on a 'suck it and see basis' at Full Council in June 2014.
The acceptance of the new constitution was bound up with negotiation over submissions to the Electoral Commission over a maintenance of councillor numbers in the upcoming boundary review (Bristol City Council, 2014) . The City Council also commissioned the Centre for Public Scrutiny (CfPS) to conduct a Review of Overview and Scrutiny in the City.
The CfPS highlighted a number of problem areas. In particular, the report called directly for greater transparency and clarity about the process of how policies are made, agreed and implemented, greater use of pre-decision scrutiny, and the creation of greater capacity for scrutiny to fulfil a policy development role (CfPS, 2015) . Overall whilst it is widely acknowledged that scrutiny in local government is failing to achieve its potential the position of elected mayor in Bristol was severely limited in its potential by systems which positioned councillors as external and reactive to policy making. Forced to retreat into a reactive and rear guard action due to a constitution and organisational system ill-suited to mayoral governance councillors found themselves far from any tangible form of policy influence, and where influence was possible it could be met by a simple veto. To evoke a simple model of the policy process the system removed scope for councillors in the areas of agenda setting and policy formulation, allowed them to be democratically bypassed at policy legitimation and focused their attention on post hoc often unconstructive scrutiny. With both underdeveloped scrutiny mechanisms and party political dynamics is remains no surprise that councillors continue to struggle with the role of mayoral scrutiniser (Copus, 2008) .
Lines of accountability
Early evaluations of the directly elected mayoral model in Bristol have shown that the mayor is better known, more visible and often a clear focal point for engagement with the electorate.
Survey data collected pre and post the introduction of the mayoral system in Bristol showed clearly that respondents across three realms, political, public management and professional, and community and business believed the city had improved in terms of the visibility of its leadership (Hambleton and Sweeting, 2015) . The Independent Mayor George Ferguson has adopted a position of 'change agent' (Stoker, 2004 ) with a clear focus on delivering the city council out of a period of turmoil and a failed system of party politics. To do this Mayor
Ferguson sought to create a rainbow cabinet or a 'Cabinet of all the talents' as self-defined.
Despite early difficulties when during the first six months of his term the local Labour party refused to allow its members to join the cabinet, the rainbow cabinet has continued and been Whilst the previous model of governance is depicted as leading to periods of 'dysfunctional decision making' (Fenwick and Elcock, 2014:17) , the system had engendered a highly developed system of cross party briefing, and soundings through party whips and leads, delivering a coherent rapport through shared experience across party lines. An officer who worked under both governance systems highlighted the efficiency of the previous model in delivering consensus; 'It was amazing how quickly things moved, we would leave a meeting with a cabinet member thinking a policy decision would be stuck for a while, and suddenly it would be good to go for a vote at Full Council, often even ahead of the Full Council whips meeting, the back channels were really well developed'. Whilst there are implications in terms of transparency of conducting such business behind closed doors, the mayor was negatively affected by the lack of this resource and left with the local press as a test bed for ideas. This effect was compounded as in the more open and visible world of direct election, it was clear that any mistakes were his and his alone, and there were few offers to help. Both in terms of institutional hardware (formal rules and structures) and institutional software (practices taking place around and within the hardware) (Skelcher, Mathur and Smith 2005) the role of mayor was restricted in its capacity to deliver policy change in Bristol.
Shifting sands and someone else's agenda
With the notable amplified focus on the mayor as an individual there was a challenge for the The new opportunities for citizen engagement also represented a change from the norm; the depth of consultations particularly around the budget was notable in terms of accessibility.
Attention and effort was drawn away from negotiation with councillors and channelled into a more direct discussion with citizens. The creation of an 'Ideas Lab' online crowdsourcing platform also represented a novel innovation even if its potential has yet to be fully realised. 
Conclusion
When the government pushed the agenda of directly elected mayors it alluded strongly to the idea that once a city went down the mayoral route, it was more likely to receive extra resources and additional powers. When Bristol was the only city to opt for the deal through a referendum it was set on a singular course and suddenly the rules of the game changed. This chapter has given an illustrative narrative account of how the role of the mayor was limited by history, context and structure. Furthermore, examples have shown how through a capacity to adapt his approach along with being consistent and assertive in the definition of his role and capabilities, Bristol's Independent Mayor has managed to deliver across a number of dimensions to overcome longstanding barriers to change.
Academic attention on the subject of elected mayors in England has often concentrated on the relative stickiness of the concept (Marsh, 2012) as it remains contested as to whether the role of directly elected mayor is a successful governance innovation to improve policy making, role itself gave scope to innovate and a capacity to do things differently from the norm, and whilst constrained by circumstance in a number of areas, the Mayor has been able to deliver a more direct and interactive form of citizen consultation, leveraged a deal with local bus companies and progressed plans for a significant capital investment in Bristol Arena. In playing to his own strengths, stressing his mandate, building on notions of direct democracy he successfully asserted his locally rooted legitimacy and used soft power to achieve his aims. Leadership as a 'collective endeavour' and laid out plans to set up a City Office to bring together the expertise and priorities of institutions and individuals and ensure that all 'major elements that make up civil society will not just be consulted, but empowered to lead' (Rees. 2016 ).
Rees leadership model seems to borrow from Total Place and other partnership approaches;
learning drawn from his time as Director of the Bristol Local Strategic Partnership and partnership roles in the National Health Service. Against an increasingly challenging financial climate, where continued cuts need to be made, alongside the responsibility to maintain statutory services, Rees is moving to bring partners and their budgets around the table in a move to increase the effectiveness of investment across local partners. In a recent interview Rees stressed he was striving for 'whole public spending approach where the police, health, education and Job Centre Plus all work together in the area for wider social justice goals', highlighting that 'we can only really deliver on some of the "wicked problems"
if we're coordinated and we agree what the shared priorities are.' (Progress, 2016:IV) .
The choice of a party mayor as opposed to an independent also represents a shift away from the previous incumbent who often found himself hampered by the dynamics of a multi-party council without a cohesive collective behind him or his ideas. Rees with both a Labour majority on the council and a potential unbroken four years without elections has greater scope to deliver his policy platform. Yet Rees is confronted with the same challenges which Bristol's main transport challenges. In Housing, the Combined Authority will be given stronger strategic planning powers including around compulsory purchasing, powers to set up Development Corporations to facilitate house building, and powers to determine crossboundary infrastructure applications which so often in the past have been mired in parochial, logistical and governance complexity. Rees like Ferguson has inherited a devolution deal which is not his own, but one which offers more significant opportunities particularly around confronting two of Bristol's most intransigent issues housing and transport.
For Marvin Rees the challenge is equal to that faced by George Ferguson but with an additional complexity and insecurity following Britain's vote to exit the European Union.
However, by taking some of the approaches and lessons learned from the experiences of Bristol's first directly elected mayor alongside a more partnership based approach Rees may also find that the strongest benefits of mayoral governance come not from the powers of the role but instead the leadership approach taken by the individual.
